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SPINOZA AND IMMORTALITY
BY ERNEST

ON

first

BRAHAM

consideration one would not expect Spinoza to have

any place

immortality

for

considers that there

is

One

differentiations

tem]:)orary

G.

in

his

teaching

seeing

that

Spiritual Substance in existence with

things

into

he
its

One needs

and persons.

however, that throughout Spinoza's system there runs
two fundamental views which are never cjuite reconciled. The first
em]>hasizes the unitv of the universe at the expense of the parts, the
second side is quite individualistic, emphasizing the parts at the
expense of the unity. This latter side comes out especially in what
to observe,

he terms the "conatus" which plays a prominent part
teaching.

According

this

to

of

the imiverse

own

preservation as against the efforts

and he makes

this ''conatus" the essence of the

have a tendency to seek their
of the other parts,

the differentiations

in his ethical

individual.
\\'h-en.

however, Spinoza

is

arguing against Descartes he takes

rather the other view based on the unity of Reality.

Descartes

were two kinds of substance, matter and mind, but
he did not regard these as having equal value. As regards matter,
there is only one material substance, viz., the whole material universe what we call a chair or a house or any particular part of the
material universe is only a temporary modification of the one maBut
terial sriistance for Descartes and as such will come to an end.
said that there

:

Descartes treats spiritual substance quite differently.
consider that there
individual

mind

is

is

He

does not

only one Spiritual Substance but that each

a genuine substance.

each spiritual substance

is

Admittedly he thinks that

something that depends for

its

existence
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upon God but
annihilates

substance will last forever unless

eacli spiritual

God

it.

Spinoza wages war against the idea of the two kinds of substance in Descart-es, material and spiritual and asserts that there

is

only one Spiritual Substance and that our minds are just temporary

modes of that one substance. Instead of saying with Descartes that
God had created material substance and a lot of other spiritual
substances. .Spinoza says

God

alone

is

Substance

known

to us

under

form of two attributes (although having infinite attributes)
these two attributes being extension and thought, that is material
form and menial form.
The attributes, however, about which
Spinoza s]«2aks are almost at times exalted by him to the level of
substance. In any case they cannot be degraded to mere qualities of
the one sul)stance.
They seem to have a rank not (|uite so high
as Sul)stance and not (|uite so low as form or quality. Each of the
Attributes, extension and tliought, is differentiated into modes. On
the side of our bodies we are modes of the attribute of extension,
on the side of our minds w-e are modes of the attribute of thought.
There is for Spinoza complete correlation between the two modes
bodv and mind, we cannot have liody without mind, nor mind
w ithout body.
Farther, Si:)inoza begins to draw a distinction between finite
and infinite modes, and the infinite modes turn out to be the eternal
the

differentiations of the attributes.

must

be regardefl as an eternal

Given a man as he really is he
of the attribute of thought on

mode

the side of his mind, and an eternal

mode

of the attribute of ex-

tension on the side of his body.

This position i^resents us with

the r^al difiiculty of reconciling the fact that man's bodv which

breaks

u])

like

correlated to his
tliat tiian's si)irit

More
of

any other finite bod)- in death, being necessarilv
spirit, would involve on a strict logical interpretation

would break up

difficulties arise in

the soul

in

.Spinoza's

too.

regard t" the

(|uesti()ii

of the iiiimortalitv

theory of knowledge.

tinguishes between thrc-e kinds of knowledge

(a)

In

this

he dis-

the knowledge

which comes through the senses (h) rational or scientific knowledge
(c inti'iiivc knowledge.
'I'he knowledge ihrough the
(a) This type is full of error.
senses depends upon the action of things iijx*!! the body and in consequence it frefpiently tells us more about our own bodv than of
I

the external things.

.Again the coniu'ction

i>

only an association be-
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tween the diflerent parts of

knowledge, there

this

C'onnected with this

connection.

first

The

the passions on the conative side.

stage

that the individual

is

is

579

is

no

real logical

type of knowledge there are

essence of knowledge at this

more acted upon than

acting, both as

regards knowledge, emotions and conations.
In regard to the second type of knowledge,— rational or

(b)

knowledge,

scientific

edge that depends

—

this

on

is

a

much clearer type. It
communes" as he

is

"notiones

a knowl-

calls

them.

There are certain facts common to all kinds of bodies including our
own, such as geometrical and mechanical properties. If we confine
ourselves strictly to these

fusing

vv'hat is

world.

Again

due to our

we shall not fall into the mistake of conown body and what is due to the .external

at this stage

one

is

not dealing with mere association

but with real logical connection between ideas.

would include more than we

should in what

is

Probably Spinoza
called logical con-

nection because at his period thinkers regarded causation as logical

sequence.

cause of

If
T'..

always followed A, then A was thought of as the
Also under the heading of logical connection he would

B

what we call laws of nature. The connections then in this
second type of knowledge which he calls scientific knowledge are
real logical connections and not mere association as in the first type
knowledge which comes through the senses. Yet on-e cannot claim,
according to Spinoza, that this second type of knowledge in entirely
satisfactory because as he would sav it is all about generalities.
include

Corresponding to it there is a rational understanding of our own
passions, and for the causes of it a psychological understanding is
required, but owing to the abstractness of this knowledge it does

own view is that one
you can replace passive
emotions by active ones, which are those in which we have clear
For instance, sorrow, a passive emotion does not
understanding.
do good either to the sorrowful person or to others. Spinoza would

not

hel])

us to control by our minds.

Spinoza's

passion can be controlled by another

if

say that v/e should not merely try to get rid of sorrow, but try to
understand the real causes of personal trouble and disaster and the
troubles and disasters which overtake others, and base then upon
that active emotion adesive to help.

So much

for the second type of

knowledge.
(c)

The

third type, intuitive knowledge,

is

supposed to combine

the merits of the concreteness of the first with the merits of the sec-

ond.

The second

is

clear

and rational knowledge and so

is

the third
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type, but the latter

not confin-ed to abstractions and o^eneralities.

is

it is difficult to know what he reallv means
bv scictitin intiiit'z'a. Probably it is a mystical knowledg^e or insight
which comes only to those who have mystical experiences.
He
saw the system of the universe as a whole, which ordinary science

Spinoza

being- a mystic,

sees piecemeal but his view seems essentially to be that the

cnily

content of the second and third type of knowledge
with

tliis

is

the

same

distinction of outlook, viz.. that in the stage of scientific

knowledge one's mind moves from one piece of the world

to another.

but in intuitive knowledge one passes to the whole immediately.
Tt

the

is

same system, however, which

the mystic sees as a whole

that the scientist sees fragmentarily as he considers one portion of

But there is another point in Spinoza's allied
knowledge and indeed its most essential element which is that special tvpe of emotion which he called "the
intellectual love of God."
From this theor\' of knowledge the Spinozian view of immortality must be developed.
Indeed it certainly cannot he grasped unless his theory of knowledge is first understood.
One is quite aware
that difficulties arise out of his theory of knowledge especially over
According to Spinoza error arises because we
the fact of error.
finite
bodi-es,
have
each of us has a special place in the world and
consequently we see things from a special angle and so we are liable
to group things together which are not closely connected in nature
and also to separate things which are closely related in nature. This
reality after another.

to this special mystical

of course \vorks
finite

modes, but

we (our

God,

that

is

is, is

an

modes but

finite

is

He

ingenious.

man

nary

takes

bits

from other

it

infinite differentiation of reality,

for
is

his

infinite

out the mistake.

true self

mix up of

a

modes.

To

is

bits
this

X(^ doubt cxcryonc

the true self, but the ordinary

is

an

not

taken

al)oiit

ll)c

nature of his true

for instance.

Xo

doubt there

self.
is

and eternal
mode and

infinite

less

mistaken about

lives entirely

of perceptual knowledge and passive emotion

maker

men

death will mean finding

more or

man who

but most

\Miat the ordi-

infinite

from one

man

tries to

says that each man,

are mistaken as to the nature of their true selves.

diff-erentiation,

eternal diiTeren-

The way Spinoza

modes.

infinite

reconcile this apparent dualism
as he really

ourselves as being

the later stages of knowledge he makes out that

bodies and minds) are not

tiations of

we regard

right so long as

all

in

is

Take

on the

level

tremendously mis
the a\erage book-

an eternal dilTerentiation of
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he knows himself

reality corres])ondin,^ to him, l)ut as

What

nniqnely correspond to him.
lakes an interest in

numher of

is

on

all right,

to

an end, consequently

he

mix up of

a

When

eternal modes.

581

calls himself,

parts extracted

does not

it

and what he

from

a great

he dies the eternal modes will go

hut the peculiar mixture which he calls himself will
this

type of

of the wise man, however, such

men

man

is

mortal.

come

In the case

as Plato or Spinoza himself.

would say no douht what the wise men take to be themselves
some confusion. That is to say there is not one eternal
single differentiation which corresponds to the wise man.
Still he
has got over so many delusions by rising to the second and third
tvpes of knowledge that what he knows as himself is inainlv one
eternal difi"erentiation though there ma}' be slight elements from the
eternal modes mixed with it in the wise man's views of himself.
vSpinoza

contains

When

this

kind of

man

dies the

fore in that sense he

is

mixture

now

of what he takes to be himself

is

really

cease but

will

tJic

bulk

an eternal mode, there-

immortal.

This seems to be what

S]:>inoza

means by immortality.

Tt

is

clearly only the immortality of the wise.

In closing one

(a)

How

tiations arise?

may add two

in the first place

If

brief criticisms.

do these mixtures of eternal differen-

one says that the bookmaker mistakes a mixture

for himself and that this mixture will not last the shock of death,

surely there must be some reason why this or any of the particular
mixture exists here and now.
One cannot see why infinite and
eternal

modes should be mistaken about

their

own

limits.

We

have

here in Spinoza the same sort of difficulty as that of reconciling the
infinite

with

On

finite

modes.

Spinoza's y'xqw there

is complete correlation between
and the extension sides of any mode. The body of the
wise man breaks up in death just in exactly the same way as the
body of ordinary man, and yet Spinoza appears to hold that the
mind of the wise man persists with very little change whilst the
mind of the man on the lower level is such a mixture and confusion
that it disappears in death and that as mind it ceases to be.
These are some of the questions arising out of Spinoza's view
of immortality, which as we have seen, arises out of his theory of
knowledge. Spinoza gives no convincing proof why the wise men

(b)

the thought

alone should be immortal.
his

The proof he gives
One Substance

metaphysical basis of the

is
:

inconsistent with

and the ordinary
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asks why this Lltimate ReaHty of which he is a part, which
produced him, and to which he contributes in his moral endeavour,
should reduce him to a cipher at the end of his earthly course ? This
question demands a more satisfactory answer than Spinoza ofifers us.

man

